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Abstract: The paper proposes a novel index to classify how 
well UK Computer Science courses articulate  cybersecurity 
related content through their course/module pages. The aim of 
this work is to raise awareness among British Universities to pay 
more attention to include and standardise cyber security content 
in computer science courses. Our results show that 80% of 
analysed courses scored 1 or 2-stars on a 5-Stars scale.  The 
results also suggest the need of a formal delivery of cybersecurity 
content from the first year of the courses and possibly in a 
collaborative manner with the British Computer Society (BCS). 
To emphasize cybersecurity education in mitigating security 
lapses, the analogy is: it is better if most people know how to use 
a match than to train many fire-fighters. 
Keywords: Cybersecurity Index, Computer Science, 
Undergraduate, Human Factors, Cyber Security Education, IT 
Education 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As reported in [1], we have two technological features 
threatening the global economy for the first time in a decade: 
i) cyber attacks and ii) data fraud. These two are within the top 
five most likely global risks such as natural disasters, extreme 
climate events and the failure to mitigate climate change. 
Technological threats are now recognized as an important 
theme and represent the first step towards improving security 
in cyberspace. 
People are at the centre of all technology developments 
and their uses. Human factors do influence technological 
features and hence are the principal issues in this context. 
According to [2], understanding the requirements for the 
regional, national or accredited cyber security programs are 
necessary to ensure that there are identified benchmarks that 
are applied and are being met. 
In USA, the National Security Agency (NSA) gives 
accreditation to Cyber Security courses that use the National 
Initiative for Cyber Security Education (NICE) Framework 
[3]. However, this is only for specific Cyber Security courses. 
In our research, we did not find similar accreditations for 
computer science courses, coherently, across a range of 
Universities globally. 
In line with Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) 
[4], there were 79,480 students enrolled on Computer Science 
courses in the UK in 2016/17.   Whether UK undergraduate 
students are being prepared to develop cyber secure programs 
for the society was investigated in [5]. To do this, the authors 
analysed the curricula of UK computer science courses. 
This work proposes a creation of an index to classify UK 
Universities by the relevance with which each institution 
offers cybersecurity content in their computer science 
courses. We didn’t look specifically at cybersecurity courses. 
Rather, this work analyses the ‘preparedness’ of UK 
undergraduate students who are expected to develop software 
that meet baseline cybersecurity standards through their G400 
courses [6].  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A list of countries that plan to include compulsory learning 
of Computer Science in secondary education, highlights how 
this discipline is being taught at an increasingly earlier age. 
This list includes Austria, Australia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Portugal, Republic 
of Korea, South Africa and Spain [7]. 
The European Commission has published a report that 
proposes three levels of knowledge on cybersecurity each 
student needs to know. These levels are: beginner, 
intermediate and advanced [8]. 
If the aim is to teach secure programming to the 
youngsters, it´s necessary to make sure the future teachers of 
Computer Science are being prepared during their 
undergraduate courses and learn how to teach their future 
pupils about secure software development. 
Conforming to Professors Moufida Sadok and Peter 
Bednar, an excessively technical focus is one of the main 
reasons why there are deficiencies in cybersecurity [9]. If 
technology is only a part of the problem, why does society 
pay so much attention to the technical side of the problem?  
“While information security risks have 
involved and financial costs of cybercrime 
have increased, security practices and 
strategies have not adequately kept up with 
 
dynamic and challenging attacks that are highly 
complex and difficult to detect.” [9] 
Conversely, are security problems caused by the high costs 
of maintaining security? 
Human factors are discussed by [10] and this work 
presents two cases on security incidents caused by human 
factors in two financial organizations. It also mentions the 
relevance of education in information security. 
Privacy and cybersecurity issues and the pleaded 
(alleged?) solutions offered by software vendors [11] [12] 
[13] [14] [15] raise doubts about vendors’ promises. The 
privacy as advertised is hardly provided. Typically, they 
recommend  the developers to explicitly alert the users of 
their products on the limitations of private browsing 
functionality. These papers testify how relevant the human 
factors are in the realm of the cybersecurity.  
Surveys such as one carried out by the DSS Company [16] 
are very common and normally highlight special product 
features. Moreover, manufacturers often exaggerate what 
their solutions offer in terms of efficient protection and 
sometimes beyond the scope of achievable security. 
Parallelly, knowing  and exploiting these loopholes, hackers 
continue to attack vulnerable and high-profile institutions. 
According to statistics from the Russian information 
security certification system, about one-third of the pieces of 
software tested exhibited vulnerabilities during a two-year 
study. According to [17], [18] and [19], it´s not known how 
failures can compromise information security and people’s 
privacy. 
It is possible to confirm that attackers can gain full access 
to encrypted files, enabling credentials previously revoked, 
including TrueCrypt [20], VeraCrypt [21], GhostCrypt [22] 
and PGP Symantec Encryption Desktop [23].  
When a trainee configures TrueCrypt or similar software 
for a business person, politician, high-ranking military or a 
researcher, installing the piece of software with the password 
“123”, the user is advised to change it to a “strong password” 
and share the password [24] [25] [26].  
Personal credentials enter the e-commerce domain when a 
user buys flowers, food, vehicles and company-shares on the 
New York Stock Exchange, or takes part in home banking to 
pay bills and/or to make other bank transactions. When 
majority of common users are affected internationaly, the 
scale is of global proportion.  
The research in this field focuses on the treatment of user 
login information (usernames and passwords) by major 
service provider websites such as search sites, home banking, 
e-mail and e-commerce. In these cases, the focus is how 
clients input important personal details, and how these 
websites manage their users’ passwords. 
In terms of security attacks, in Existential Forgery, an 
attacker can forge an authenticator for some unspecified user 
[27], which means that he/she cannot target one specific user. 
Whereas in Total Break, an attacker can recover the user key 
and can, therefore, build valid authenticators at his/her will. 
As mentioned in [28], it´s important to analyse a vast class 
of information on the navigation activities that browsers save 
onto the hard-disk. Credentials were found in the form of 
clear text in non-volatile memory. This occurred with all 
browsers tested by the author of the mentioned paper. 
Independent of the browser, Gmail, Amazon, eBay, Hotmail, 
and the Santander, Caixa and Citibank websites showed the 
similar vulnerability [29]. 
Investigations into cryptographic programs, web browsers 
and web credentials have shown that the credential 
management, security and privacy protection measures are 
currently quite poor. Meanwhile, investigations into “in-
private navigation” show that the “privacy software” does 
not, in fact, gives adequate privacy to the user. Many 
researchers have focused on the technological aspects of the 
cases such as flaws in the code written or project errors. But, 
if vendors and users continue to manage credentials the way 
they are doing, it cannot be more vulnerable than a locked car 
with the car-key left in the door-lock. What can one expect 
from cybersecurity and privacy when many users and 
organisational practises are relaxed in protecting personal 
credentials? 
 “We use TrueCrypt in a 
corporate/enterprise environment. Is there a 
way for an administrator to reset a volume 
password or pre-boot authentication password 
when a user forgets it (or loses a key file)? Yes. 
Note that there is no ‘back door’ implemented 
in TrueCrypt. However, there is a way to ‘reset’ 
volume passwords/key files and pre-boot 
authentication passwords.” [26] 
 “If someone needs to access an encrypted 
file or a shared encrypted laptop, the encryption 
password will need to be shared, unlike your 
University password which should always be 
kept private. If you forget the encryption 
password for a file or USB stick, then the data 
will be inaccessible. In the case of laptops 
encrypted by the University, IT Services will 
store a recovery disk that will enable the laptop 
password to be reset.” [24] 
In the same way when universities orient their pupils and 
users towards using “in-private” navigation, one has to stand 
still and review what is being taught about security and 
privacy [30] [31]. 
In [32], cybersecurity is classified in four categories: 
public, infrastructure, business and general. The basic 
message is to transform cybersecurity courses in a 
multidisciplinary direction. While this is laudable, 
broadening the knowledge of security experts do not solve the 
issue.  
“From a socio-technical perspective, it is 
claimed that a viable system would be more 
user-centric by accommodating and balancing 
human process rather than entertaining an 
expectation of a one-sided change of behaviour 
of the end-user.” [9].  
“Two reasons could potentially explain the 
poor effectiveness of the implemented security 
solutions and procedures: the boundary 
problem of risk analysis scope and the 
background of involved actors in risk 
assessment and security policy design.” [9]  
Sadok and Bednar’s the work considers human-centricity 
as the best approach to address the cybersecurity problems. 
 
It´s necessary to adjust the whole background, specifically, 
the way cybersecurity and privacy are explained to the 
students. It proposes five units for High School programming 
courses in Israel: fundamentals, advanced programming, 
second paradigm, applications and theory. Likewise, [33] 
declares that security is among the key aspects in the field of 
computing. 
Twenty-two years after the latter study, an interesting 
piece of research carried out in the US about teaching 
Computer Science in High School has suggested a new 
curriculum for teaching programming to teenagers [34]. 
Unfortunately, no security or privacy aspects have been 
considered so far.   
In United States the national Centres of Academic 
Excellence in Cyber Defense Education (CAE-CDE) works 
with NSA to improve criteria to elevate the quality of cyber 
security education [35]. It presents three case studies of 
different institutions with different CAE statuses highlighting 
the importance of the CAE designation in enhancing 
cybersecurity education at these institutions. Unfortunately, 
all these studies and initiatives are about specialized cyber 
security undergraduate courses designed to prepare cyber 
security specialists. 
In New Zealand, there have been discussions about 
Computer Science on the High School curriculum, albeit, 
without taking cybersecurity and privacy into account [35]. 
In the UK, researchers have been concerned with teaching 
Computer Science to produce more and more programming 
from the secondary level onwards [36] [37] [38].  
“The challenge of introducing security in a 
sensible and useful manner can be addressed by 
considering the contextual perspectives”. [9]  
However, the basis of cybersecurity must be introduced in 
early education, according to the Joint Task Force on 
Cybersecurity Education [39]. While this report provides 
guidelines for delivering cybersecurity education, all 
managers of technological courses could benefit from reading 
it. 
The focus of our work is to suggest an index that 
demonstrates how cybersecurity is taught in Computer 
Science (G400) courses in the UK with the aim to emphasize  
its relevance and to foster improvement initiatives in the 
University curricula. 
III. METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION 
From the perspective that everything has a human element, 
the authors gathered information to understand what UK 
universities are thinking about cybersecurity and how 
students on relevant courses are being trained. For this, it was 
necessary to analyse the curricula of the offered courses. For 
that, it was decided to study the common basis of relevant 
course, disregarding cybersecurity specific courses. In 
particular, to understand the depth and breadth of cyber 
security related topics and their application, authors found  
Computer Science courses quite appropriate.  
The authors considered the discipline components of 100 
G400 Computer Science or similar courses [6], from the top 
100 UK universities offering such courses as selected by the 
ranks in “Webometrics Ranking of World Universities” - an 
initiative of the Cybermetrics Lab- a research group 
belonging to the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones 
Científicas (CSIC) being one of the largest public research 
body in Spain [41]. This ranking includes 280 UK 
universities. This study considers that the first 100 UK 
universities representing a sizable sample of the UK  
universities that offer some cybersecurity related content on 
their Computer Science or related courses  
The title of the module or discipline and the content of the 
discipline as seen on Fig.1, Fig.2 and Fig3., when available 
online, were manually read line by line to identify 
cybersecurity content keywords such as security, privacy, 
cybersecurity, risk management, forensics, cryptography, 
safe software, safe programming, cybercrime, data 
protection, credential management and others security terms 
or expressions, or other contextualized elements that refer to 
cybersecurity enforcement. 
 
Fig. 1 One of the best module descriptions founded. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Security content in the module description. 
 
  
Fig. 3 Security content in the module title. 
If a word or expression linked to security was found during 
the reading of a discipline’s menu, it was scored as 
summarized in Table 1.  
Annotations were made by the authors to identify at which 
point in time the security element was addressed, as well as 
whether the subject discipline was mandatory or optional. 
The proposed Index of Relevance in Cyber Security 
(IRCS) privileges the mandatory content and the content 
given at the beginning of the course. The higher the 
mandatory content and the higher the content in the first year 
of the course, the higher  the IRCS index as given by: 
 
𝐈𝐑𝐂𝐒 = ෍ 𝑀𝐶 ∗ 1 + ෍ 𝑂𝐶 ∗ 0.2
+ ෍ 𝐹𝑌𝐶 ∗ 1
+ ෍ 𝑆𝑌𝐶 ∗ 0.3 + ෍ 𝐿𝑌𝐶 ∗ 0.15 
 
Where,  
MC = Mandatory content; 
OC = Optional content; 
FYC=First year content; 
SYC=Second year content; 
LYC=Latest year content. 
 
 
Table 1-Collected data extracted by reading course descriptions provided by 
each institution on their website and classified by IRCS. 
IRCS University OC MC 
Year 
FYC SYC LYC 
9,2 Robert Gordon University 0 8 0 0 8 
5,1 University of Winchester 1 3 1 3 0 
4,6 University of Liverpool 0 4 0 0 4 
3,65 Lincoln University 1 2 1 1 1 
3,45 Bangor University 0 3 0 0 3 
3,45 University of Portsmouth 0 3 0 0 3 
3,3 De Montfort University 0 2 1 1 0 
3,3 University of Bedfordshire 0 2 1 1 0 
3,15 University of Bradford 0 2 1 0 1 
2,65 University of Kent 1 2 0 0 3 
2,6 University of Derby 0 2 0 2 0 
2,45 University of Reading 0 2 0 1 1 
2,45 Edge Hill University 0 2 0 1 1 
2,3 University of Oxford  0 2 0 0 2 
2,05 University of Plymouth  5 0 0 2 3 
2 
University of Central 
Lancashire 0 1 1 0 0 
2 Bournemouth University 0 1 1 0 0 
2 
London Metropolitan 
University 0 1 1 0 0 
2 University of Abertay 0 1 1 0 0 
2 University of Sunderland 0 1 1 0 0 
1,9 Bristol University 3 0 1 0 2 
1,9 Staffordshire University 3 0 1 0 2 
1,65 University of Birmingham 1 1 0 1 1 
1,65 University of Salford  1 1 0 1 1 
1,5 University of Leeds  1 1 0 0 2 
1,5 University of Ulster  1 1 0 0 2 
1,5 University of Hertfordshire 1 1 0 0 2 
1,4 University of Stirling 4 0 0 0 4 
1,3 University of Cambridge 0 1 0 1 0 
1,3 University of Exeter  0 1 0 1 0 
1,3 Oxford Brookes University 0 1 0 1 0 
1,3 University of Huddersfield  0 1 0 1 0 
1,3 
University of South Wales 
(Glamorgan & Wales 
Newport) 0 1 0 1 0 
1,3 Teesside University 0 1 0 1 0 
1,3 
Birmingham City University 
(University of Central 
England) 0 1 0 1 0 
1,2 Keele University 1 0 1 0 0 
1,15 King's College London 0 1 0 0 1 
1,15 Lancaster University 0 1 0 0 1 
1,15 Aston University 0 1 0 0 1 
1,15 
Goldsmiths University of 
London 0 1 0 0 1 
1,15 University of East London 0 1 0 0 1 
1,15 
London South Bank 
University 0 1 0 0 1 
1,15 
Cardiff Metropolitan 
University (University of 
Wales Institute Cardiff) 0 1 0 0 1 
1,05 Loughborough University 3 0 0 0 3 
1,05 Brunel University 3 0 0 0 3 
1,05 City University London 3 0 0 0 3 
0,7 Imperial College London 2 0 0 0 2 
0,7 University of Southampton 2 0 0 0 2 
0,7 
Newcastle University 
Newcastle upon Tyne 2 0 0 0 2 
0,7 University of Sheffield  2 0 0 0 2 
0,7 Cardiff University 2 0 0 0 2 
0,5 Kingston University London  1 0 0 1 0 
0,35 University of Manchester 1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 University of Warwick  1 0 0 0 1 
 0,35 University of Nottingham 1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 
Queen Mary University of 
London 1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 University of Leicester  1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 University of Saint Andrews  1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 University of Surrey 1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 Queen's University Belfast  1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 
The University of the West 
of England 1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 
Manchester Metropolitan 
University 1 0 0 0 1 
0,35 University of Chester 1 0 0 0 1 
0 University College London  0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Edinburgh 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Glasgow 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Durham University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of York  0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Aberdeen 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of East Anglia 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Sussex 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Bath 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Strathclyde  0 0 0 0 0 
0 Heriot-Watt University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Essex 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Swansea University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Royal Holloway University 
of London  0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Aberystwyth University / 
Prifysgol Aberystwyth  0 0 0 0 0 
0 Cranfield University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Birkbeck University of 
London 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Hull  0 0 0 0 0 
0 Northumbria University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Brighton 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Sheffield Hallam University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Liverpool John Moores 
University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Nottingham Trent University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Greenwich  0 0 0 0 0 
0 Middlesex University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Coventry University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Westminster 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
University of 
Wolverhampton 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Glasgow Caledonian 
University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Anglia Ruskin University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 Napier University Edinburgh 0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Leeds Beckett University 
(Leeds Metropolitan 
University)  0 0 0 0 0 
0 
Canterbury Christ Church 
University 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Bolton  0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Gloucestershire  0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Northampton 0 0 0 0 0 
0 University of Worcester  0 0 0 0 0 
IV. DISCUSSION 
For simplicity, one may cluster (or group) the courses 
given in Table 1 on a 5-Stars scale as follows:  
 
1 Star = IRCS <1 
2 Stars = IRCS between 1 to 1,99 
3 Stars = IRCS between 2 to 2,99 
4 Stars = IRCS between 3 to 3,99 
5 Stars=  IRCS >= 4 
 
54% of courses – 1 Star 
26% of courses – 2 Stars 
11% of courses – 3 Stars 
6% of courses – 4 Stars 
3% of courses – 5 Stars 
 
In this work, we attempted to examine how well UK 
students on computer Science courses are exposed to 
mandatory cybersecurity content at the beginning of the 
course. 
The apparent  absence of anything about security and 
privacy in the curricula says a lot about the relevance of this 
theme on the courses in question. If cybersecurity content is 
not written into the discipline’s syllabus, it is likely that it 
won’t be taught formally and the consequences of this are 
potentially disastrous as emphasized in the literature review. 
The heuristic analysis indicates that more than one-third of 
G400 courses in the UK leave cybersecurity as their 
mandatory curricula leaving cybersecurity as an optional 
discipline. 
The first stage in the process of acquiring knowledge is to 
“remember” [44]. To remember something, one needs to be 
exposed to something new at an early stage with reinforced 
exposure carefully planned for the set duration.  
Reflecting on [10], people are at the centre of any 
technological design and as mentioned by the author of [42], 
the education of cybersecurity content seems to be failing to 
attend the societal needs. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Based on our novel IRCS index for the sourced dataset, we 
concur to [46] [5] [44] in the sense that the best manner to 
make cyberspace safer is to teach cybersecurity to Computer 
Science students from the first year of the University as a 
mandatory content.  
It is very desirable and important  to have an evolved and 
more objective IRCS index to effectively measure the 
cybersecurity content in the Computer Science curricula. As 
a future work, we would like to derive robust IRCS by 
enhancing Table 1 with other scores such as professional 
certification or accreditation liked to the course. In addition, 
 
we would like to automate the scoring with exhaustive 
keywords that can fully encompass the course and module 
webpages.  
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